By: Jerome A. Singh and Peter A. Singer


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It has been suggested that the best way for the United States to keep biotechnology-enhanced weapons away from terrorist groups is for the country to limit support for related research and training to US scientists.

In this letter to Nature, Jerome Singh and Peter Singer argue against such an isolationist approach. They say that increasing research support and training in biotechnology and genomics to scientists in the developing world may be the best way to prevent bioweapons attacks against the United States and its allies.

If Southern scientists are given a stake in the Northern system through sponsored research opportunities, they will be less likely to want to help terrorist actions against Northern interests, they say.

Link to letter in Nature

Reference: Nature 420, 605 (2002)

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