Summary

Written by policy analyst Stas Burgiel, this policy brief provides a progress report on the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The CBD is the single most important international convention for protecting the world’s biodiversity (the variety and variability of organisms and ecosystems) and ensuring that our use of it is sustainable.

The brief covers the CBD’s history – from the outcry over species loss in the 1970s and 1980s, to the 1992 Earth Summit where the convention was introduced and signed, up to its present – then describes how it works, who provides it with scientific advice, and how it affects the conservation of genetic resources. As well as discussing its relative successes, such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (which governs the movement of genetically modified organisms from one country to another), Burgiel also highlights the many difficulties the Convention has had to weather.

Its own status is a hugely limiting factor: as a framework convention, its commitments are fairly general and rely on countries to interpret and put this guidance into action. It has also been dogged by accusations of a Northern bias, and by a reluctance to ratify on the part of some countries. The main criticism, however, is that biodiversity loss has not abated – a situation the signatories hope to improve by setting a 2010 target for reducing the rate of loss.

What is the UN Convention on Biological Diversity?

The UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is the single most important international agreement designed both to protect the world’s biodiversity, and to ensure that our use of it is sustainable. To that end, it has three principal objectives: to conserve biological diversity, to encourage the sustainable use of biological resources, and to ensure the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from such use.

The Convention was signed at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development – known as the Earth Summit – in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It entered into force in December 1993, after it had been ratified at a national level by 30 of the countries that had signed it in Rio. Its member countries currently number 188 and are known as ‘Parties’ to the Convention. They meet roughly once every two years.

Their regular meeting, known as the Conference of the Parties (COP), is the Convention’s highest governing body, and is authorised to make binding decisions that affect all signatory states and to adopt additional protocols to the Convention. The COP consists primarily of environment ministers and civil servants, and is supported by a scientific advisory body known as the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA).

In addition, the CBD’s secretariat, which is based in Montreal, Canada, is charged with organising the Convention’s meetings and facilitating information flow and assistance to states that are implementing the COP’s decisions at the national level.

The relatively limited role of the secretariat arises from the fact that the CBD is a ‘framework convention’. This means that although its commitments are legally binding on all signatories, these are implemented either through national legislation, or through what are called ‘protocols to the convention’. The main one – indeed the only protocol agreed so far – is the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which regulates the transboundary movement of genetically modified organisms. 

How did it come into being?

The origins of the Convention lie in the 1970s and 1980s. At the time, there was mounting public and political concern – confirmed by scientific findings – that the world’s biological diversity was being lost at an unprecedented rate, and that human activities were largely to blame.

Between 1972 and 1992, more than 300 international environmental agreements were negotiated in an attempt to slow or reverse this process. These included a number of important individual measures, such as the 1973 CITES convention regulating trade in endangered species, and the 1979 Convention on Migratory Species. But given the continued loss of biodiversity, it was clear that further measures were needed. So in 1980, the world’s largest conservation organisation, IUCN – the World Conservation Union – proposed a new international framework convention to strengthen and harmonise the various individual treaties. 

Developing countries were not enthusiastic about this idea. They did not like the prospect of a new global treaty that would, they feared, promote a ‘Northern agenda’ and prevent them from using their natural resources for their own social and economic development. This concern was reflected in the way that early drafts of the Convention included an annex envisioning a list of ‘protected areas’ as priorities for conservation. (The idea was rejected, and the CBD is only now re-engaging in discussions on this sensitive topic, which remains an important goal for many conservationists.)

At the end of a long debate, developing countries used the fact that they are the repositories of the biological resources about which so much concern was being expressed as a lever to obtain various concessions from the developed world. These concessions included a promise of financial support and the transfer of technology (for example, in biotechnology and monitoring technologies) from developed countries; a protocol on regulating biotechnology; recognition of the important role of indigenous communities in protecting biodiversity; and provisions determining who should have access to, and share the benefits of, genetic resources (that is, living plants, animals and products derived from them), and under what conditions.

Such measures amount to a commitment from governments and corporations in richer countries to share the benefits of products derived from genetic resources with those in the developing world who could claim rights to their development – or at least to their ownership. Under the text of the CBD, biodiversity-rich developing countries also succeeded in obtaining legal recognition as sovereign owners of their biological resources. No longer were these to be considered the common heritage of humankind, as previously viewed by the international community.

How does it work?

The main commitment made by every signatory state of the CBD is to develop a national strategy (or action plan) to manage and protect their own biodiversity. In principle, the signatories are also expected to put such strategies into action, and to integrate them as comprehensively as possible across all sectors of public policy – not just in government environment departments.

Key to the CBD’s implementation, particularly in developing countries, is a funding mechanism known as the Global Environment Facility (GEF). This is financed by individual governments, and projects are developed through the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. The GEF is based at the Bank’s headquarters in Washington DC.

So far, the GEF has disbursed over US$1.6 billion for biodiversity activities, and ‘leveraged’ even more from governments and international institutions. This money is used to help developing countries plan their national biodiversity strategies, and to support new legislation and projects to put those plans into action.

Throughout all its activities, the CBD has been keen to involve a wide range of actors in its decisions. These include representatives of other international agreements, a broad range of environmental NGOs, the business community, indigenous peoples and local communities, and the worldwide research community.

Scientific advice in the Convention

The founders of the CBD envisaged that signatories would base their subsequent decisions about key biodiversity concerns primarily on advice from scientists and conservationists from both developed and developing countries, with minimum interference from politicians. This was an ambitious aim that has proven difficult to realise.

Part of the problem stems from the fact that members of the Convention’s science advisory body, the SBSTTA, are nominated by member states. In practice, this means that the scientists on this body tend to reflect the views of their sponsoring countries. Indeed, in the SBSTTA’s early years, its meetings were dubbed ‘mini-COPs’: the issues raised, the opinions expressed, and the overall tenor of the meetings generally mirrored the political debates of the CBD’s main COPs.

This has changed significantly in recent times. Meetings of the SBSTTA have become high-level, independent forums at which scientists and policymakers can explore the interaction between research and policy relatively free of direct political pressure.

At the same time, however, there has been resistance to recommendations from the secretariat to set up a more comprehensive biodiversity science panel, similar to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). One reason has been a fear among developing countries that such a body would be dominated by scientists from developed countries, who would impose a perspective skewed towards the North on their conclusions and advice. Another is that developed countries have been disinclined to provide funding for such a body.

The CBD has, however, endorsed the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, a comprehensive study of the links between humans and ecosystems sponsored by a range of UN agencies, non-governmental organisations and other sources.

And rather than setting up a single comprehensive science advisory panel, the CBD has agreed to create a number of expert groups, as well as rosters of qualified advisors who are consulted on specific issues. In addition, formal agreements have been reached on sharing information and ideas on strategy with other biodiversity organisations, programmes and processes. These include the Global Invasive Species Programme; the UNEP/World Conservation Monitoring Centre; Diversitas, a global network of biodiversity researchers; and CAB International.

The resulting flow of information, however, has created its own problems. Despite efforts within the Convention process to streamline its agenda and consolidate information for delegates, developing countries are too frequently overloaded with scientific and policy advice during meetings. This is compounded by a lack of capacity at the national level to translate the advice into concrete action, a major challenge now facing all those concerned with the effective implementation of the CBD and the achievement of its goals.

The Cartagena Protocol

The CBD’s most notable – if controversial – achievement to date has been the adoption of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. This came into force on 11 September 2003, and lays down rules under which crops and other organisms which have been genetically modified can be transferred from one country to another.

Such an agreement might appear to be outside the CBD’s main focus on the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources. But its existence reflects a desire by many developing countries to improve their ability to exploit and regulate modern biotechnology – and to use the CBD negotiating process to achieve this goal. They have succeeded in doing this in the face of opposition from exporters of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) – such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Argentina – who argue that the restrictions embedded in the proposal could unnecessarily hamper international trade in biotech products.

Under the Protocol, anyone exporting GMOs such as seeds, plants or fish intended for direct release into the environment will need prior permission from the importing country. Organisms intended for direct human consumption, for animal feed, or for use in food processing can be freely exported once a central biosafety information clearing-house has been notified. However, the importing countries can still halt or delay a shipment by calling for a risk assessment. (GMOs intended for use in contained facilities, for transit through third countries, or for use as human pharmaceuticals are generally excluded from the Protocol’s agreement procedure.)

An important aspect of the Cartegena Protocol is that its implementation is based on the use of the controversial ‘precautionary principle’. This ‘better safe than sorry’ approach allows countries to refuse the importation of a GMO if they believe that there is insufficient scientific information about its impact on human health or the natural environmental. Countries can include socioeconomic factors arising from impacts on biodiversity conservation in making such a decision.

The precautionary principle has many critics, who argue that it demands an assurance of ‘zero risk’ – or at least a level of certainty about low-level risks – that is impossible to achieve in practice. However, its proponents argue that it is an essential element of any strategy designed to prevent irreversible changes to natural biodiversity that could occur if the risks of GMOs turn out to have been ignored or understated.

Access to genetic resources and sharing the benefits

An equally contentious topic during negotiations over the CBD has been the issue of who should have access to genetic resources – which includes living plants, animals and their products – and who should share the benefits from their use.

The Convention gives a country sovereignty over the biological resources found within its geographical borders, and states that any commercial benefit derived from these resources should, for example, recognise that country and/or indigenous and local communities for their conservation efforts, as well as any prior knowledge about its potential utility.

The principles of fairness and equity behind this commitment are widely acknowledged. But putting it into practice has not been easy, given the divergent views and interests of industry, non-governmental organisations, governments and indigenous peoples.

In 2002, the CBD signatory states adopted the so-called Bonn Guidelines on access to genetic resources and benefit sharing. These guidelines, which are non-binding, provide a framework for developing national legislation on access and benefit sharing, address the potential roles of different stakeholders, and give countries advice on how to settle disputes.

At the instigation of a coalition of biodiversity-rich developing nations – known as the Like-Minded Group of Megadiverse Countries – the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg in 2002, went further. It called for “an international regime” to be established within the framework of the CBD that would “promote and safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources”. At present, discussions are taking place on whether such a regime should form a binding protocol to the Convention.

Another controversial move centred on patents. This was the decision that the CBD should encourage scientists and companies applying for patents on products based on genetic resources to voluntarily disclose the country of origin as well as the use of any relevant traditional knowledge.

This move is intended to reduce the incidence of ‘biopiracy’ – the illegal appropriation of genetic resources. However, a number of countries have questioned whether it is appropriate for the CBD to make such recommendations. This is because of the prior existence of an international agreement on intellectual property rights known as Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which falls under the World Trade Organisation. 

The Convention’s impact – and limitations

A decade after the CBD entered into force, it is legitimate to ask what impact the treaty has had. Sadly, the worldwide loss of biodiversity continues at an alarming rate. This is happening even though the amount of the Earth’s land surface designated as protected has now increased to around 12 per cent.

Partly as a response to this apparent lack of progress in stemming the decline of biodiversity, the Convention’s member states have now set a target date of 2010 for significantly reducing the rate of biodiversity loss – a goal the WSSD reinforced in 2002.

One of the limitations of the Convention is undoubtedly the fact that it is a framework treaty with no dispute settlement process or enforcement mechanism. This means that in practice, member states are bound only weakly by their obligations. Another limitation is that the secretariat is, in general, restricted to facilitating the exchange of information and organising meetings of the Convention.

Persuading governments to put the decisions and recommendations of the member countries and the SBSTTA into action has not been easy. One hurdle is the usual time lag between the presentation of policy advice and its implementation. This is particularly acute in developing countries, which often lack the institutional, scientific, legal and/or financial capacity to implement recommendations.

A second hurdle is the fact that many of the CBD’s initial decisions focused primarily on data gathering and environmental assessments, rather than on implementation. This was certainly the case with forests, where ongoing political debates about a broader forest convention merely led to the reinforcement of a peripheral programme of work on forests.

Only recently has there been a shift to a more action-orientated approach, as well as serious efforts to evaluate progress in other ecosystems, such as marine and coastal areas, inland waters, and arid and semi-arid regions.

Finally, a number of issues require collaboration among countries sharing boundaries. These can include river basin management, transnational ’peace parks’ and protected areas on the high seas. Action on such issues requires not only technical resources and capacity, but also the political will of all countries involved – a task that is rarely straightforward.

Answering the critics

The difficulties of implementing the CBD have been compounded by the fact that critics of the Convention – and there are many – emerged almost as soon as the ink had dried on the first signatures at the 1992 Earth Summit. These critics included some developed countries, scientists and corporate representatives.

In the scientific community in particular, many feared that subjecting genetic resources to government control and regulation would hamper both public and private sector research. This concern has, to some extent, been borne out as countries begin to turn international principles into domestic legislation and regulation. Meanwhile, industry, civil society groups and governments continue to spar over the application of intellectual property rights to products and genetic sequences derived from natural resources.

The United States was perhaps foremost among developed countries in resisting potential restrictions on biotechnology and intellectual property rights. Indeed, President Bush (senior) refused to sign the CBD at the Earth Summit in Rio. Although President Clinton signed the Convention two years later, so far, the United States remains one of a small handful of countries that has not ratified the agreement, and so has refused to frame its own national laws in line with the CBD.

Even within countries that have both signed and ratified the Convention, biodiversity activities frequently remain a low political priority at the national level – particularly in developing countries faced with many other pressing social and economic priorities. Hopefully, the adoption by CBD member countries of a 2010 target to reduce the rate of biodiversity loss will improve things.

If the concerted effort to reach this target is to succeed, it will entail more than developing a range of indicators to measure improvement across the CBD’s work programmes. It will also mean acknowledging the need to convince governments to adopt policies that lead to positive results. Such an effort will undoubtedly face resistance, as it will involve a closer scrutiny of national policies and performance – including an assessment of funds committed to protecting diversity. But the target will never be reached unless all the governments involved come up with both the resources and the political will needed for the task.

The author is a policy analyst in the international programme at Defenders of Wildlife, a research and advocacy organisation based in Washington DC, United States. Previously he worked as a writer and editor for the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, and as a coordinator and programme staff for the Biodiversity Action Network. He holds a PhD in international relations from the American University in Washington DC, and focuses on issues related to biodiversity, invasive species and trade.